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The effects of social ties on coordination: conceptual
foundations for an empirical analysis
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Abstract This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior.
After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model
of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination
game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game
while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity
averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning
in order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies
on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the
latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to
discriminate among the models presented in the paper.
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Introduction
In classical economic theories, most models assume that agents are self-interested and
maximize their own material payoffs. However, important experimental evidence
from economics and psychology has shown some persistent deviation from such self-
interested behavior in many strategic situations. These results suggest the need to
incorporate social preferences into game theoretical models. Such preferences de-
scribe the fact that a given player not only considers his own material payoffs but also
those of other players (Margolis 1982). The various social norms created by the
cultural environment in which human beings live give some ideas of how such
experimental data could be interpreted: fairness, inequity aversion, reciprocity, and
social welfare maximization are concepts that behavioral economists are familiar
with, and which have been shown to play an important role in interactive decision
making (e.g., see Charness and Rabin 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Rabin 1993a).
In fact, various simple economic games, such as the trust game (Berg et al. 1995)
and the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982), have been extensively studied in the past
years because they illustrate well the weakness of traditional game theory and its
assumption of individualistic rationality. Moreover, given the little complexity carried
out in such games, the bounded rationality argument (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001)
does not seem sufficient to justify observed behavior. Social preferences appear as a
more realistic option because they allow to explain the resulting behaviors while still
considering rational agents.
However, although many economic experimental studies (e.g., Berg et al. 1995;
Güth et al. 1982) have shown that people genuinely exhibit other-regarding prefer-
ences when interacting with perfect strangers, one may wonder to what extent the
existence of some social relationships between individuals may influence behavior. In
this article, we will refer to such social relationships as “social ties.” Indeed the
dynamic aspect of social preferences seems closely related to that of social ties: one
may cooperate more with a friend than with a stranger, and doing so may eventually
enforce the level of friendship. Yet, in spite of their obvious relevance to the study of
human behavior, very little is known about the nature of social ties and their7 actual
impact on social interactions.
Our attempt, through this paper, is to study the possible effects that positive social
ties can have on human cooperation and coordination. Our main hypothesis is that
such relationships can influence a player’s choice by modifying his preferences: an
agent may choose to be fair conditionally on the relative closeness to his partner(s). In
order to investigate these questions, we propose a theoretical analysis of a new kind
of two-player game that allows us to disentangle predictions from theories based on
self-interest, social preferences, and social ties. Furthermore, we demonstrate the need
to introduce an alternative model to capture the concept of social ties as continuous
variables. Indeed, while we claim that social ties strongly rely on group identification,
we show that considering the concept of team reasoning is too limited to fill this
purpose as it is built upon a binary interpretation of group identification (i.e., either
one identifies with a group or not).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. “A definition of social ties” defines
the concept of a social tie that we consider. Through “A theory of how to model social
ties,” we introduce a formal model that embeds social ties and allows to specify
players’ behavior in strategic interactions accordingly. As a means to evaluate our
theory, we propose, in “A social ties game,” a game that allows to measure the
behavioral effects of social ties. We provide, in “Equilibrium predictions with self-
interested players,” a game theoretical analysis of this game by considering only self-
interested agents. In “Equilibrium predictions under models of social preferences,”
we perform a similar analysis by considering other-regarding agents according to
theories of social preferences. After analyzing this strategic scenario through our
model of social ties in “Equilibrium predictions under our model of social ties,”
we propose an alternative interpretation of the same game by considering
agents as team-directed reasoners through “Players as team-directed reasoners.”
“Why team reasoning cannot express gradual social ties” then illustrates the
relevance of our model of ties by discussing the limited expressivity of team
reasoning in the context of social ties. Finally, in “Further hypotheses,” we
evaluate various models in the context of social ties and we state some relevant
behavioral hypotheses.
A definition of social ties
No formal definition of a social tie is provided either in the literature on social
psychology or in the experimental economics literature focused on social preferences.
Thus, given the vagueness and the ambiguity that the term may suggest, we begin by
clarifying the concept that we consider.
First, we choose to restrict our study only to those ties that can be judged to be
positive: examples include relationships between close friends, married couples,
family relatives, classmates, etc. In contrast, negative ties may include relationships
between people with different tastes, from different political orientations, with dif-
ferent religious beliefs, etc.
In order to specify the foundations of such social ties and the possible reasons for
their emergence, let us consider the well-known concept of social identity from social
psychology. According to social identity theory (Hogg 2002; Tajfel and Turner 1979),
an individual’s social identity is built upon a set of social features, each of which may
refer to any type of salient characteristics that can be shared by individuals in a
particular context. For example, a person may identify himself as a student of the
University of Toulouse, a supporter of Barcelona’s soccer team, a Democrat, a
Catholic, etc.
According to various theories in social psychology (see, e.g., Abrams and Hogg
2006; Hogg 2000), the construction of an individual’s social identity is determined by
two complementary motivations. The first motivation is self-enhancement which is
underpinned by one’s individual need to promote self-esteem (as pointed out by
Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), “Being a member of a social group is an important
reflection of who I am”). Reduction of subjective uncertainty about one’s perceptions,
attitudes, feelings, behavior, and one’s self-concept and place within the social world
is the second motivation.
It can be reasonably assumed that people can give different degrees of importance
to those social features defining their social identity, depending on the context: for
example, while one’s identification as a soccer player is more important than one’s
identification as a student during a soccer game, the reverse may hold for the same
individual during a math exam at the university.
Following this interpretation, our claim is that:
Statement 2.01: A social tie between two individuals exists if and only if they
share the same social features defining their social identities, and this is common
belief among them.
Note that the previous claim implies that a social tie is necessarily bilateral in the
sense that if an individual i is tied with another individual j, then j is also tied with i.
For example, an individual who believes to share the same political convictions with
a given politician cannot induce a social tie as long as the latter does not also believe
so (one could speak of the existence of a unilateral tie in this case, though it is not
“social” according to the above statement).
Moreover, the previous statement simply characterizes the minimal condition for
the existence of a social tie. As an illustration, one can consider the well-known
Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) (Tajfel 1970), which corresponds to an experimen-
tal methodology from social psychology that investigates the minimal conditions
required for discrimination to occur between groups. Experiments using this approach
(Tajfel et al. 1971) have revealed that arbitrary and virtually meaningless distinctions
between groups (e.g., the color of their shirts) can trigger a tendency to cooperate
more with individuals within one’s own group than with others. In this case, one
should note that such meaningless social features satisfy the minimal condition for
being considered as a social tie from the previous statement. However, in principle
such social tie should be quite weak.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that an important property of social ties lies
in its quantitative aspect, that is, two individuals can be more or less socially tied with
each other. To be more precise, we assume that a social tie between two individuals
can be measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 and 1 respectively stand for
the minimum and maximum strength for the tie.
This interpretation therefore suggests that the strength of a social tie can be
determined by the quantity and importance of shared social features. One can indeed
assume that sharing a high number of social features (defining one’s social identity)
with high importance leads to a high social tie value. On the other hand, having
conflicting social characteristics, or sharing a low number of features with high
importance, or sharing a high number of features with low importance can lead to a
lower tie value.
Moreover, another aspect that, we believe, influences the strength of a social tie
between two individuals is the quantity and quality of past interactions between
them. More precisely, given two individuals sharing a certain number of social
features with a given importance, the strength of the tie between them is higher in
the situation in which the two individuals had frequent meaningful interactions in the
past than in the situation in which there were no previous meaningful interactions.1
1 With the term “meaningful” we mean that during past interactions, the two individuals had the occasion to
know each other by exchanging ideas, opinions, sharing positive emotions (e.g., they mutually enjoyed
playing tennis together), etc.
As a concrete example to illustrate the previous interpretation, one may consider
the case of online dating systems on the internet. Those systems, which are clearly
meant to build social ties between individuals (assuming an affective tie is a special
case of a social tie), are based on the matching of social features that define their
social identities. However, while one cannot deny the effectiveness of such systems
(Hitsch et al. 2010), it is suggested in Frost et al. (2008) that some interaction between
two individuals is also important as it can allow them to know each other more
accurately. Indeed, by providing a way to obtain reliable information about one
another, social interactions happen to be a relevant tool against possibly inaccurate
stereotypes, which can often be considered as an unfortunate consequence of cate-
gorizing individuals into social groups, as implied by social identity theory.
The following points summarize our interpretation of social ties:
– The minimal criterion for the existence of a social tie between two individuals is
for them to commonly believe that they share the same social features that define
their social identities.
– A social tie between two individuals has a quantitative dimension which depends
on the following two parameters:
1. The quantity and importance of shared social features that define both in-
dividuals’ social identities.
2. The quantity and quality of past interactions between both individuals.
Following our interpretation, one might then argue that the situation described by
the minimal group paradigm satisfies the minimal condition for the existence of a
social tie, even though this tie has a relatively low degree of strength (the number of
shared social features is one) and its importance might be considered to be reasonably
low.
A theory of how to model social ties
In this section, we introduce a novel model that characterizes the agents’ behavior in
the presence of social ties. Our model of social ties shares features with both team
reasoning and social preferences theories.
Similarly to team reasoning theories, our model is built on the concept of group
identification, which is of high relevance when considering social ties. In fact,
individuals that are socially connected may be expected to identify themselves with
the same group, which may consequently lead them to choose actions as a member of
this group. In “Players as team-directed reasoners,” we discuss various theories of
team reasoning, at the same time indicating which properties are in common with our
approach to social ties. In “Why team reasoning cannot express gradual social ties,”
we underline the inadequacy of such theories to interpret in full the effects of social
ties, thereby claiming for a novel approach—the one introduced in this section—able
to capture specific key features of social ties left aside by team reasoning.
Similarly to theories of social preferences, our starting assumption is that a social
tie between two individuals induces them to behave according to some aggregation of
their individual preferences. In “Equilibrium predictions under models of social
preferences,” we consider two leading theories of social preferences (inequity aver-
sion and fairness) that are easily comparable to our approach in the specific interac-
tive strategic situation where the behavioral effects of social ties are evaluated.
More precisely, our current approach is inspired by the existing concept of
empathetic preferences as presented by Binmore in (2005): an agent’s empathetic
preferences consist in combining his actual own preferences with his preferences
when imagining himself in the other agent’s position. In other words, an empathetic
agent does not take into account the other’s actual decision, he instead only reasons
about his own decision in the other’s position (taking into account the other’s
preferences). This concept also refers to the existence of a “veil of ignorance,” as
introduced by Rawls in (1971), behind which agents make their decision without
knowing in which player’s position they will actually act. As a consequence, such an
empathetic behavior can be reduced to simply choosing the corresponding action
from the strategy profile that maximizes the group utility.
One should note that our model is also related with Alger and Weibull’s model of
Homo Moralis (2012). The difference is that their model requires the game to be
symmetric,2 whereas our model does not have any restriction and can apply to all
sorts of games.
Formally, let us consider two players i and j (note that this model could easily be
generalized to an arbitrary number of players). Moreover, let Si and Sj respectively
denote the set of i’s strategies and the set of j’s strategies, and pii(si, sj) the payoff
function for player i when both i and j respectively play their strategy si and sj. For
every si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj, the Social Ties utility function of player i is then given by:
U STi si; s j
 
¼ 1−k ij
 
:pii si; s j
 
þ k ij max
s
0
j
∈S j
U si; s
0
j
 
where kij ∈ [0, 1].
The function U (si, sj) stands for the group utility function, which may be
characterized by one of the following two well-known principles.
Let us first define a group utility function Um(si, sj) that satisfies Rawls’ maximin
criterion (1971).
Um si; s j
 
¼ min pii si; s j
 
; pi j si; s j
  
This criterion corresponds to giving infinitely greater weight to the benefits of the
worse-off person.
As an alternative, one may also consider a function of social welfare Us(si, sj) that
satisfies classical utilitarianism (i.e., by maximizing the total combined payoff of all
players).
U s si; s j
 
¼ pii si; s j
 
þ pi j si; s j
 
Parameter kij in the Social Ties utility function measures agent i’s subjective social
tie towards agent j. Setting kij to 0 corresponds to a nonexisting tie (e.g., j is a perfect
stranger to i) whereas setting kij to 1 means that i feels socially very close to j (e.g., j is
2 A game is symmetric when all players can switch roles without changing their strategies and the associ-
ated payoff.
i’s best friend). In the latter case, one should note that, in the presence of a strong tie
with agent j, agent i does not face a strategic problem anymore: indeed, j’s strategy sj
becomes irrelevant to the calculation of i’s utility. Thus, agent i only needs to solve a
classical problem of individual decision making by selecting the action from the
strategy profile which maximizes the group utility. As a result, i’s action may then be
interpreted as “doing the right thing for the group assuming that all other players also
do the right thing for the group.”
In order to make our approach operational, through the next section we
propose a concrete scenario involving strategic interaction among players. The
specific game that we consider leads to theoretical predictions under our
social ties model that differ both from those obtained under the traditional
assumption of self-interested players and by those provided by well-known
theories of social preferences. Hence, we think that this example is appropri-
ate to show how our novel approach can explain players’ behaviors not
captured by leading approaches respectively in traditional and behavioral
game theory.
A social ties game
Having previously analyzed the main characteristics of social ties, we now propose
the following game that appears to be well suited to study their behavioral effects.
Two colleagues, Alice and Bob, have agreed to cook together and eat in Alice’s
place, though Bob likes cooking less than Alice. Half an hour before the dinner, Alice
makes a phone call to Bob so as to express her interest to go out to her favorite
Japanese restaurant, whereas Bob instead suggests to go to a nice Italian restaurant
that he recently heard about, with the two restaurants located on opposite sides of the
city. Alice then makes it clear that she prefers them cooking rather than Italian food.
On the other hand, Bob indicates that, even though he does not particularly enjoy
cooking, he still prefers it to the Japanese cuisine. Moreover, Bob reminds Alice of
his seafood allergy, which makes eating Japanese more costly for him than eating
Italian is costly for Alice. Both individuals also commonly realize that, as the
restaurants in question are very popular, they are always overcrowded, which makes
it impossible for a person alone to get a table there. Finally, Alice notifies Bob of her
intention to go eat outside before the phone call suddenly gets interrupted.
In this scenario, the main questions that arise are the following: assuming Alice
and Bob barely know each other, will they manage to meet and eat at the same
restaurant that evening? Would they behave differently if they were very close friends
instead?
For example, the fact itself that Alice would notify Bob her intention to go eat
outside may depend on their social tie. And even the sign of this dependence cannot
be easily disclosed through intuition alone. Indeed, on the one hand, a close relation-
ship with Bob should lead Alice to take the “risk” of leaving her place so as to
possibly meet him in his preferred restaurant, thereby maximizing their group utility
function. On the other hand, the social tie might lead Alice to confirm that they will
both eat at her place before the unexpected interruption of the phone call: if she
knows that Bob, because of their social tie, is “uncertain” between maximizing the
group utility function (going to his preferred restaurant) and behaving in a fully
rational way (going to her preferred restaurant), then she should safely reaffirm that
they eat at her place, in order to prevent miscoordination.
In order to formally analyze the dilemma provided by this situation, let us define
the corresponding abstract representation, as shown in Fig. 1, which we will call the
Social Ties (ST) game. This ST game defines a two player game organized in two
stages. During the first stage, only Player a (i.e., Alice) is active, and she has to
choose between In or Out (i.e., whether to stay at Alice’s place or go eating outside).
In the latter case, the outcome is more beneficial to Alice who gets 20 (Bob only gets
10 as it is more costly for him to cook than it is for Alice). On the other hand, if Alice
chooses to go eat outside (i.e., In), both players enter the second stage of the game
that corresponds to a basic coordination game. Ca and Cb define respectively Alice
and Bob’s choice to go to the Japanese restaurant. Similarly, Da and Db define Alice
and Bob’s choice to go to the Italian restaurant. If both coordinate on the (Ca, Cb)
solution, then Alice and Bob get 35 and 5, respectively, and if both coordinate on the
(Da, Db) solution, then they get 15 (Alice) and 35 (Bob). In any other case (i.e., where
they choose different restaurants and are therefore unable to get a table), both players
win nothing (0).
As we will detail in the next sections, this game provides an ideal environment to
discriminate between different theories of how two socially tied people should act.
One may note that our ST game corresponds to a variant of the Battle of the Sexes
(BoS) game with outside option (see Cooper et al. 1993). Indeed, as shown in Fig. 2a,
the only difference lies on the symmetrical property within the coordination subgame
that we voluntarily removed here: unlike in the BoS game, the lowest payoff is
different in the two coordination outcomes (eating Japanese is more costly to Bob
than eating Italian is for Alice: 5≠15). The main motivation to introduce this type of
asymmetry is to create some incentives for players to favor the group as a whole (in
fact, there is no unique best outcome for the group in a BoS-like subgame). However,
one may note that the dilemma introduced by the ST subgame does only concern
Alice’s preferences: if Alice is self-interested, she will aim at reaching the (Ca, Cb)
outcome, whereas if she considers the social welfare of the group, she might wish to
reach the (Da, Db) outcome. On the other hand, Bob’s preference orderings in this
Fig. 1 Social ties game
subgame are the same no matter whether he wishes to maximize his self-interest or
the social welfare.
Similarly, considering a Hi-Lo-like subgame would not match our current study as
it does not offer any dilemma between satisfying self-interest and maximizing the
social welfare: in fact, in the Hi-Lo matching game (see Fig. 2b), both players always
obtain the same payoff no matter the outcome, which explains the high rate of
coordination on the most profitable outcome for both players, independently of
whether there exists a tie between them.
One may also notice the similarity of our ST game with the Dalek game presented
in (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) (a corresponding subgame is depicted in Fig. 2c).
The main difference is that one solution of the coordination subgame ensures perfect
equity in the Dalek game. Indeed, as in our case, the Dalek game also introduces
some dilemma between maximizing one’s self-interest and playing the fairest out-
come. However, unlike in our ST game, it does not introduce any dilemma between
satisfying self-interest and maximizing the social welfare (i.e., the combined payoffs
of every player). Although this game would be interesting to investigate, focusing on
it may also make it more difficult to observe the actual effects of social ties on
behavior: as a consequence, the absence of any clear incentive to play the fairest
solution in the Dalek game may eventually lead to a higher rate of miscoordination,
independently of the presence of such ties. On the other hand, the signal of perfect
equity in the Dalek game may also appear so strong that it could reinforce the stability
of coordinating on the corresponding solution (i.e., (Da, Db)), even when no ties are
involved.
Equilibrium predictions with self-interested players
To begin with, we analyze the above ST game by assuming that agents are solely
own-payoff maximizers.
Through the rest of the paper, we note Ci and Di to respectively stand for sub-
strategies “Ci if In” and “Di if In” in the context of the ST game.
Let us first state that this ST game contains three Nash equilibria (NE) in pure
strategies, which are the following:
In;Ca;Cbð Þ; Out;Ca;Dbð Þ; Out;Db;Dbð Þ
Moreover, the ST game also has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy, which
consists of Alice always playing Out (i.e., with probability 1) and Bob playing Db
with a probability of 3/7. This solution however has to be distinguished from another
Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategy, which consists of Alice always playing Out
a b c
Fig. 2 Existing coordination games
first (i.e., with a probability of 1) and playing Da with a probability of 1/8 in the
subgame while Bob then plays Db with a probability of 7/10 (Note that this corre-
sponds to the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy in the subgame). Thus, the
respective expected payoffs in both of these cases are 20 for Alice and 10 for Bob.
However, it is worth indicating that all NE in mixed or behavioral strategies are
simply irrelevant to the ST game: if Alice is willing to randomize in the subgame or
believes that Bob will, then she is always better off by playing Out in the first place.
Considering subgame perfect NE, which can be computed through the back-
ward induction method, allows to rule out the solution (Out, Ca; Db) even
though it is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, although the prediction to play Out is
perfectly rational for Alice, it here relies on the fact that she would not be
rational had she played In the first place: given that Bob plays Db in the
subgame, Alice’s only rational move would be to play Da instead of Ca (which
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in the subgame). Note that the previous
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy is ruled out by this principle while the
Nash solution in behavioral strategy still remains.
Furthermore, considering the forward induction (FI) principle allows to restrict the
previous set of subgame perfect NE to those solutions, which resist the iteration of
weak dominance. In the context of our ST game, this leads to the following solution:
first Alice’s strategy (In, Da) is weakly (and strictly) dominated by any strategy
involving Out. Then Bob’s strategy Db becomes weakly dominated by Cb. Thus
Alice’s strategies (Out, Ca) and (Out, Da) are both weakly (and strictly) dominated by
(In, Ca; Cb). Therefore, the unique FI solution, which resists iterated weak domi-
nance, is as follows:
In;Ca;Cbð Þ
Indeed it turns out that fully rational players should play this solution, which
can be interpreted as follows: while playing In, Alice signals Bob that she
intends to play Ca (if she intended to play Db, she would have played Out in
the first place). Therefore Bob’s unique rational move is to play Cb. However,
while this interpretation justifies the existence of the above solution, it does not
explain why the other backward induction solution is not rational. To continue
the argument, let us then consider the solution (Out, Da; Db), which can be
interpreted as follows: Alice plays Out because she expects Bob to play Db in
case she had played In. This chain of reasoning is clearly erroneous because
Alice’s conditional expectation does not match what she would really expect
had she actually chosen to perform In. Indeed, as shown before, if Alice
performs In, Bob’s unique rational move is to play Cb, thus no matter what
Alice does during the first stage, she cannot expect anything else than Bob
playing Cb. Consequently, her unique rational move is to play (In, Ca), and
Bob’s best response is to play Cb. Moreover, note that, for the same reason, the
previous Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategy does not resist this FI
argument.
The interesting characteristic that this analysis brings about is that the
validity of this FI argument is independent of Bob’s preferences. This therefore
suggests that such a game introduces some “first-mover” advantage, assuming
that it is common knowledge among them that they both are self-interested
agents.
Many studies in the experimental economic literature have provided support to this
FI argument (see, e.g., Balkenborg 1994; Brandts and Holt 1989, 1995; Cachon and
Camerer 1996; Cooper et al. 1992, 1993; Shahriar 2009; Van Huyck John et al.
1993).
One of the first papers in this direction is Brandts and Holt (1989). Cooper et al.
(1992) investigate a coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria and report
that a payoff-relevant outside option changes play in the direction predicted by FI.
Van Huyck John et al. (1993) report the success of FI in a setup in which the right to
participate in a coordination game is auctioned off prior to play. Cachon and Camerer
(1996) investigate a setup in which subjects may pay a fee to participate in a
coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. They report that play is consistent
with FI.
While many experiments support the fact that people’s strategic behavior
relies on the FI argument (see, e.g., Cooper et al. 1992, 1993; Van Huyck John
et al. 1993), there is also contrary evidence. In (1993), Cooper et al. obtain the
FI solution when it coincides with a dominance argument but the same outcome
is predicted when FI makes no prediction. Brandts and Holt (1995) also show
that the FI is a good prediction only if it coincides with a simple dominance
argument. In (2003), Brandts et al. find evidence against FI in an industrial
organization game.
Other work have shown that the temporal factor of the game is relevant to FI
reasoning. In Cooper et al. (1993) and Huck and Muller (2005), the FI solution
predicts well subjects’ behavior in an experimental game in extensive form, but does
poorly when subjects are presented with the normal form game. A similar problem
seems to arise in Caminati et al. (2006) who analyze games similar to ours but who
work essentially with the normal form.
However, all these works consider games that are slightly different from the
interactive strategic situation on which we focus in this paper. One may then wonder
whether the asymmetry introduced in our ST game does alter the game theoretical
prediction.
Equilibrium predictions under models of social preferences
In this section, we reinterpret our ST game through the use of well-known
economic theories of social preferences and analyze players’ equilibrium be-
havior under these theories. In fact, these models allow one to consider not
only the self-interested motivations of the players, but also their social motiva-
tions, which may then be particularly important in the context of social ties. In
other words, a player’s utility is not characterized by his own material payoff
only, but also those of the other players. We choose to focus on the concepts of
inequity aversion and fairness, which seem to be the most relevant to our ST
game. Other models of intentions-based fairness and reciprocity (see, e.g.,
Rabin 1993b) do not appear to be suitable to such a coordination game. Apart
from the problem of multiple equilibria in beliefs that characterizes such belief-
dependent approaches, it would be difficult to unambiguously define what is
“kind” and what is “unkind” in the players’ strategy set, by using only first and
second order beliefs.
Theory of inequity aversion
In the models proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), players are assumed to be intrinsically motivated to distribute payoffs in an
equitable way: a player dislikes being either better off or worse off than another
player. In other terms, utilities are calculated in such a way that equitable allocations
of payoffs are preferred.
Formally, consider two players i and j and let x={xi, xj} denote the vector of
monetary payoffs. According to Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity aversion model, the
utility function of player i is given by:
U IAi xð Þ ¼ xi−αi max x j−xi; 0
 
−βi max xi−x j; 0
 
where it is assumed that i≠ j, βi≤αi and 0≤βi<1.
The two parameters can be interpreted as follows: αi parametrizes the
distaste of person i for disadvantageous inequality while βi parametrizes the
distaste of person i for advantageous inequality. One should note that setting
these parameters to zero defines some purely self-interested agent. The con-
straints imposed on the parameters are meant to ensure that players cannot
distaste advantageous inequality more than disadvantageous inequality in order
to be realistic.
Clearly, applying such a model to our current ST game can literally trans-
form its whole structure, depending on the values assigned to parameters αi and
βi. Let us then perform a game theoretical analysis that involves such inequity
aversion parameters.
The main observation that can be made is about the effects of Alice’s
preference ordering on her behavior. In fact, assuming that βa≤αa, then
Alice will never play the strategy (In, Da), no matter how inequity averse
she is:
– if βa<3/4 and αb<1/6, then Alice and Bob’s optimal behavior remains as if they
were self-interested (i.e., the FI argument still holds). Thus, Alice’s unique
rational strategy is to play (In, Ca) while Bob will rationally play Cb.
– if βa<3/4 and αb≥1/6, then Alice is always better off by playing (Out, ·): the
coordination subgame yields a unique Nash equilibrium (i.e., (Da, Db)), which is
strictly dominated by strategy (Out, ·).
– if βa≥3/4, then Alice is always better off by playing (Out, ·): for any αa≥βa, any
outcome from the coordination subgame is strictly dominated by playing (Out, ·)
(see Fig. 3 for an example).
The main result of this analysis is that the value of αa and βb are
irrelevant to defining Alice and Bob’s optimal behavior. In other words, only
Alice’s distaste about advantageous inequality can affect her preference or-
dering in the ST game. Similarly, only Bob’s distaste about disadvantageous
inequality can affect his decision. One should also note that inequity aversion
does not keep the “first mover” advantage mentioned in the previous section:
Alice’s first move does signal Bob not only about her low level of inequity
aversion, but also about her expectation of Bob’s low level of inequity
aversion. That means that if she plays In, then the resulting outcome is entirely
depending on Bob’s level of inequity aversion (either (In, Ca; Cb) or (In, Ca; Db)
will be played).
The sets of NE and of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE), in the context of
the ST game played with inequity aversion, are summarized in Table 1 (note that FI is
irrelevant in this case because the SPE is unique for every vector (αi, βi), with i∈{a,
b} and αi, βi∈[0,1]).
Theory of fairness
Let us now consider another type of social preferences model that in turn
relies on the notion of fairness. In (2002), Charness and Rabin propose a
specific form of social preference they call quasi-maximin preferences. In their
model, group payoff is computed by means of a social welfare function which
is a weighted combination of Rawls’ maximin and of the utilitarian welfare
function (i.e., summation of individual payoffs) (see, Charness and Rabin
2002, p. 851).
Fig. 3 Transformed ST game with extremely inequity averse players (αa=βa=αb=βb=1)
Table 1 Equilibrium solution concepts for inequity averse agent(s) (βa≥3/4 or αb≥1/6)
NE SPE
(Out, Ca, Cb) (Out,Ca,Cb) if αb<1/6
(Out, Da, Db) (Out,Da,Db) if βa<3/4
(Out, Ca, Db) (Out,Ca,Db) if αb≥1/6 and βa≥3/4
(Out, Da, Cb)
Formally, consider two players i and j and let x={xi, xj} denote the vector of
monetary payoffs. According to Charness and Rabin’s fairness model, the utility
function of player i is given by:
U Fi xð Þ ¼ 1−λð Þ  xi þ λ  δ min xi; x j
 
þ 1−δð Þ  xi þ x j
  	
where δ, λ∈[0, 1]. Moreover, the two parameters can be interpreted as follows: δ
mea-sures the degree of concern for helping the worst-off person versus maximizing
the total social surplus. Setting δ=1 corresponds to a pure “maximin” (or “Rawlsian”
criterion), while setting δ=0 corresponds to total-surplus maximization. Parameter λ
measures how much player i cares about pursuing the social welfare versus his own
self-interest. Setting λ=1 corresponds to purely “disinterested” preferences, with
player i caring no more (or less) about her own payoffs than others’, while setting
λ=0 corresponds to pure self-interest.
As for the previous model, the parameters δ and λ can considerably change the
structure of the ST game, which is why we propose a new game theoretical analysis
involving such fair agents.
The first observation is that while fairness may slightly alter Bob’s preferences, the
(In, Da; Db) outcome always remains the best option: the only difference with the
classical model is that he may come to prefer the (In, Ca; Cb) outcome to the (Out, ·)
outcome when δ<2/3 and λ>1/3.
Similarly, Alice’s preferences also get affected by such notion of fairness. The
main result is that a new FI solution may emerge through such a social preferences
model. In particular:
– If λ<1/2, then Alice may still play the FI solution strategy as predicted by
traditional game theory (i.e., (In, Ca)), depending on the value of δ.
– If 1/2≤λ≤3/4, then no prediction can be made without considering probabilistic
beliefs: both NE in pure strategies in the subgame are always at least as good for
Alice as playing (Out, ·).
– If λ>3/4 and δ>2/3, then Alice may play a FI solution strategy (i.e., (In, Da)) that
mainly relies on her other regarding preferences (see Table 2): solution (In, Da;
Db) indeed becomes preferred to playing (Out, ·), which is preferred to solution
(In, Ca; Cb) (see Fig. 4 for an example).
Moreover, one should note that, as for the original version of the game (see
“Equilibrium predictions with self-interested players”), the Out option for Alice
always dominates the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies from the coordination
subgame, no matter what the values of λ and δ are.
Table 2 Equilibrium solution concepts for fair agents (λ>>3/4 and δ>>2/3)
NE SPE FI
(In, Da, Db) (In, Da, Db) (In, Da, Db)
(Out, Ca, Cb) (Out, Ca, Cb)
(Out, Da, Cb)
The above analysis suggests that the ST game may in fact contain two
distinct focal points for the players, which can be identified by the two possible
FI solutions. Therefore, one can state that the current ST game yields a unique
social-welfare equilibrium3 if and only if players have either some strong self-
interested preferences (λ<<1/5) or some strong other-regarding preferences (λ
>>3/4 and δ>>2/3). In the latter case, one should note that the players’
sensibility to the maximin principle needs to “dominate” that of the utilitarian
welfare function.
The sets of NE, of SPE, and of FI solutions, in the context of the ST game played
by fair agents, are shown in Table 2.
Equilibrium predictions under our model of social ties
Similarly to the theories of social preferences considered in the previous section, our
main claim is that the strength of the social tie existing between two players has some
important effects on their preferences (and consequently on their expected behavior),
as suggested in “A theory of how to model social ties.” However, as we believe that
the type of payoff transformation used in our model is more appropriate to the context
of social ties, we illustrate through this section how it can disagree with the previous
concepts from “Equilibrium predictions with self-interested players” and “Equilibri-
um predictions under models of social preferences” in terms of equilibrium pre-
dictions. More specifically, let us apply our model of social ties to the above ST
game.
Given the subjective social ties parameters kab and kba, and the constant values k1,
k2, k3∈[0,1] such that k1≤k2≤k3, we have:
– if kab>k3, then the unique rational play for Alice and Bob is to coordinate on (In,
Da; Db), independently of kba.
3 The social welfare equilibrium introduced by Charness and Rabin (2002, p. 852) corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium for some given values of δ and λ.
Fig. 4 Transformed ST game for extremely fair agents (λ=δ=1)
– if kab>k1 and kba>k2, then, as in the previous case, the unique Nash equilibrium is
again for both players to coordinate on the (In, Da; Db) outcome (see Fig. 5 for an
example).
– if kab≤k1 and kba>k2, then Alice should play (Out, ·), in response to Bob playing
Db in the subgame.
– if kab≤k1 and kba≤k2, then Alice and Bob should follow FI reasoning and play
(In, Ca; Cb). In this case, as the strategic structure of the game remains as in its
original version, the game-theoretic analysis from “Equilibrium predictions with
self-interested players” still applies.
– if k1<kab≤k3 and kba≤k2, then both players are unable to coordinate on a
unique Nash equilibrium outcome in the subgame: both (Ca, Cb) and (Da, Db) are
NE. As a result of such indecision in the subgame, Alice’s optimal strategy
is (Out, ·).
In the above analysis, the constant values for k1, k2, and k3 depend on whether the
players follow the maximin function (i.e., U=Um) or the utilitarianism principle (i.e.,
U=Us). Table 3 provides the corresponding constant values for each of these types.
Moreover, this analysis considers the most general case where ties may be unilateral
(i.e., where kab≠kba): our current model therefore allows to state that, for instance,
Alice feels close to Bob while Bob does not feel close to Alice.
One should note from this interpretation that Alice will always play her strategy
(In, Da) whenever kab>k3, and similarly, Bob will always play his strategy Db
Fig. 5 Transformed ST game for socially tied agents (U=Um and kab=kba=1)
Table 3 Constant tie values for each type of player
Constant (ki) Egalitarianism (U=Um) Utilitarianism (U=Us)
k1 1/2 1/5
k2 1/2 1/3
k3 4/5 7/9
whenever kba>k2. Such an observation, combined with the fact that k3>k2, indicates
that Alice’s decision is more restrictive than Bob’s: if k2<kab, kba<k3, then Alice
needs to take Bob’s decision into account in order to make her decision, whereas Bob
will play Db independently of Alice’s action. As a consequence, introducing social
ties in the context of this game may allow Bob’s threat of playing Db to become more
credible to Alice’s eye. In other words, social ties may simply turn Alice’s first mover
advantage (as suggested in Huck and Muller 2005) in Bob’s favor.
One should also note the distinction between using utilitarianism or egalitarianism
in the tie utility function. As shown in Table 3, utilitarianism allows to coordinate
more easily on the (In, Da; Db) outcome than egalitarianism (i.e., k1, k2, and k3 have
lower values when U=Us). On the other hand, players following egalitarianism are
expected to coordinate in the subgame more often than in the case of utilitarianism
(i.e., when U=Um, Alice should play (Out, ·) if and only if kab=k1=k2=1/2).
However, one may state that the formulation of social ties from “A theory of how
to model social ties” is too general with respect to the concept presented in “A
definition of social ties.” In fact, according to Statement 2.01, we assume that a social
tie is restricted to be bilateral, which may not always be the case in the above analysis.
In order to match this criterion, one then needs to add the following constraint:
kab ¼ kba
In this case, assuming k=kab=kba, coordination on the (In, Da; Db) outcome is
reached only when k>k2. Similarly, coordination on the (In, Ca; Cb) outcome is
reached only when k<k1. On the other hand, Alice will play (Out, ·) whenever k1≤k≤
k2, as miscoordination would be expected in the subgame. As this constraint sim-
plifies decision making for both players in the ST game, one should note that it also
removes any opportunity for Bob to exploit Alice: whenever k2<kab, Alice will
always play (In, Da) independently of Bob’s decision.
More specifically, about determining Alice and Bob’s dinner plan, this analysis
leads to the following interpretation. On the one hand, if the existing social relation-
ship is sufficiently weak between Alice and Bob, then Bob should be influenced by
Alice’s intention of going to her favorite Japanese restaurant and, consequently, he
should choose Cb in order to maximize her own payoff. On the other hand, in the
presence of a sufficiently strong social tie between them, Alice should be influenced
by Bob’s intention of doing what is best for the group and, consequently, she should
choose Da in order to maximize the group payoff.
Furthermore, in the particular case of an intermediate measure of social ties between
Alice andBob, each individual may then become uncertain about the other’s choice of either
acting fully rationally and go to Alice’s favorite restaurant, or doing what is best for the
group and go to Bob’s favorite restaurant. In response to such a high risk of meeting at the
wrong restaurant, Alice should then reaffirm her intention to stay eat at her place with Bob.
However, one should note that the above constraint on both players’ subjective
social ties (i.e., kab=kba) suggests the existence of a common scale for measuring such
ties. In fact, in order for Alice to determine the actual social tie level between Bob and
herself, then she must first make sure that her notions of the weakest and highest
possible ties are the same as Bob’s (e.g., does “being best friends” have the same
meaning for both of them?). For example, it is fair to say that everybody does not
share the same level of tie with a complete stranger (some are genuinely more
cooperative than others). One may then argue that the non-easy task of normalizing
one’s social ties scale is already part of what defines the social tie itself: indeed the
higher the social tie value, the more the concerned individuals are likely to share the
same social ties scale (e.g., if I feel that we are best friends, but I ignore what “being
best friends” means to you, then I will not risk being exploited by you, and my social
tie with you will consequently remain weak). As a result, this analysis follow our
definition of social ties from “A definition of social ties” as it suggests that social ties
are intrinsic psychological factors that are influenced by the agents’ epistemic states
(the more I know about you, the more my measure of our social tie is reliable).
Players as team-directed reasoners
Our proposed model of social ties from “A theory of how to model social ties”
appears to share some common properties with another well-known concept that also
relies on group identification: team reasoning. We therefore provide, in this section, a
detailed analysis of the ST game through the various theories of team reasoning as a
means to illustrate the common characteristics as well as the differences that exist
with our model of social ties.
One should note that, in the context of the ST game, considering collective utility
functions (see, e.g., the classical utilitarianism and the maximin principle from “A
theory of how to model social ties”) from the players’ individual viewpoint can lead
to a transformed game similar to that depicted in Fig. 4 from “Theory of fairness”. In
this case, the resulting subgame in Fig. 4 has similar properties as the well known Hi-
Lo matching game: as both players have the same preferences over outcomes, they
indeed benefit if and only if they coordinate with each other in the subgame.
However, their subsequent payoffs depend on which action they do coordinate on.
The interesting property of this transformed subgame is that it introduces a dilemma
that even economic theory cannot solve. However, while game theory is indeed
unable to predict any particular outcome (i.e., both coordinated outcomes of the
subgame are Nash solutions), it is shown in (Bacharach 2006) that people would
tend to coordinate on the action that leads to the most rewarding outcome for both,
i.e., (Da, Db).
In order to interpret such intuitive behavior, some theorists have proposed to
incorporate new modes of reasoning into game theory. For instance, starting
from the work of Gilbert (1989) and Regan (1980), some economists and
logicians (Lorini 2011) have studied team reasoning as an alternative to the
best-response reasoning assumed in traditional game theory (Bacharach 1999;
Colman et al. 2008; Sugden 2000, 2003). Team-directed reasoning is the kind
of reasoning that people use when they perceive themselves as acting as
members of a group or team (Sugden 2000). That is, when an agent i engages
in team reasoning, he identifies himself as a member of a group of agents S
and conceives S as a unit of agency acting as a single entity in pursuit of some
collective objective. A team reasoning player acts for the interest of his group
by identifying a strategy profile that maximizes the collective payoff of the
group, and then, if the maximizing strategy profile is unique, by choosing the
action that forms a component of this strategy profile.
Furthermore, as suggested in (Hakli et al. 2010), the concept of team reasoning
also refers to Tuomela’s I-mode/we-mode distinction from (Tuomela 2010).
According to Tuomela, the I-mode consists of reasoning as a private person according
to two possible principles: an agent reasoning in plain I-mode will seek to satisfy self-
interest as suggested by classical economic theory (this corresponds to the type of
reasoning underlying the analysis from “Equilibrium predictions with self-interested
players”). On the other hand, an agent reasoning in pro-group I-mode is concerned
with promoting the group’s interests, and as a result will make a decision with the
individual intention to maximize the group utility. As an example of such a benefactor
behavior (as called by Bacharach in 1999), one may consider the existing theories of
social preferences presented in “Equilibrium predictions under models of social
preferences” (e.g., the concept of social welfare equilibrium presented in (Charness
and Rabin 2002) illustrates this type of thinking). It is clear however that even such
pro-group I-mode thinking, which relies on preference transformation, fails to predict
some very intuitive behavior such as in the well known Hi-Lo matching game, as
shown in (Bacharach 2006; Colman et al. 2008) (see Fig. 4 for a similar example).
The alternative concept of we-mode reasoning instead relies on what Bacharach calls
agency transformation, which consists of conceiving the situation not as a decision
making problem for individual agents (cf. the I-mode), but as a decision making
problem for the group conceived as an agent.
Let us now perform a detailed analysis of team reasoning applied to the ST game
according to both Sugden and Bacharach’s different theories.4 Figure 6 illustrates a
representation of the ST game from the group’s viewpoint when considering the
maximin principle as the group utility function. In this case, the transformed ST game
considers a unique player, which corresponds to the group {Alice, Bob}. We indicate
with sasb any group’s strategy. One therefore notes that the best strategy for the group
is to always play (In, Da; Db).
First, according to Sugden’s theory (Gold and Sugden 2007; Sugden 2003), a
simple epistemic interpretation of a0team reasoning (from Alice’s viewpoint) in the
current ST game can be the following (for U∈{Us, Um}):
Statement 8.01: If Alice believes that:
– She is a member of the group {Alice, Bob}.
– It is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that both identify with {Alice,
Bob}.
– It is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that both want the value of U to be
maximized.
– It is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that (In, Da; Db) uniquely
maximizes U. Then she should choose her strategy (In, Da).
Following Statement 8.01, it is then clear that if Alice shares her beliefs with Bob,
then the resulting outcome will be (In, Da; Db; i.e., Bob will similarly choose the
corresponding option Db). According to Sugden (2003), a player has reason to act as a
team member and to choose the action that forms a component of the strategy profile
4 A more detailed general comparison of Sugden and Bacharach’s theories of team reasoning can be found
in (Gold 2012).
maximizing collective payoff, conditional on assurance that the other players also act
as team members. That is, to act as a member of a team, one must be confident that
the other players act as members too. More fundamentally, “[…] team reasoning does
not generate reasons for choice unless each member of a team has reason to believe
that there is common reason to believe that each member of the team endorses and
acts on team reasoning […]. This is a condition of assurance” (Tajfel 1970, pp. 176–
177). In other words, the main characteristics of Sugden’s theory is that team
reasoning relies on strong epistemic foundations and is very restrictive in that matter:
an agent will not take the risk to team reason and be “suckered” by other agents who
do not.
Let us now consider Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning as an alternative to
Sugden’s previous interpretation, which, as shown in (Hakli et al. 2010), yields the
same action recommendations as Tuomela’s we-mode reasoning in any game-
theoretic situation. In (1999), Bacharach introduces the concept of unreliable team
interaction, which corresponds to a game structure in which there is a probability that
a given player identifies with a team and chooses the action which maximizes the
team benefit (i.e., the player plays in the we-mode), and another probability that the
player is a self-interested agent who tries to maximize his own benefit (i.e., the player
plays in the I-mode). In this sense, the interaction is “unreliable” because there is no
certainty that a player will reason and act as a team member. A team member will then
act according to his expected utility based on what others will do (including players
who do not team reason). In such an unreliable team interaction, Bacharach also
introduces the notion of a team protocol, which consists of specifying a strategy for
every player when identifying with each team (or in each mode). As an example, the
protocol (Ca, Cb, and DaDb) specifies that Alice and Bob will respectively play Ca and
Cb if in I-mode, and will respectively play Da and Db if in we-mode. Through this
concept of team protocol, Bacharach differentiates an agent’s behavior depending on
whether he identifies with the group or not. The players then reach a protocol
equilibrium if and only if, given the probability ω that each player reasons in we-
mode, neither players nor the group can increase its expected utility by individually
deviating from it. In other words, such a protocol equilibrium may simply be
interpreted as a Nash equilibrium in the extended game where the group {Alice,
Fig. 6 ST game from the group’s viewpoint (with U=Um)
Bob} becomes an extra player. Such a property illustrates a major difference between
Bacharach’s theory and our model of social ties. In fact, while an unreliable team
interaction requires to consider additional players in the game in order to perform
strategic reasoning, each of which corresponding to a combination of individual
players (cf. the concept of a team protocol), our model of ties instead only leads to
a modification of each individual’s utility, leaving the game structure in its original
version (i.e., the sets of players and strategies remain unchanged).
Table 4 describes the sets of Protocol equilibria for each probability value ω that
each player reasons in we-mode in the ST game.
One can see from Table 4 that, when the agents reason in I-mode (i.e., w=0), the
set of protocol equilibria matches that of NE. Conversely, if both agents play in we-
mode (i.e., w=1), then the only equilibrium is to play the solution (In, Da; Db).
Moreover, one can note that the maximin principle requires a lower probability of we-
mode reasoning (w>3/4) than the utilitarianism principle (w>8/9) in order to con-
verge to this unique solution. In other words, the utilitarianism principle requires a
stronger identification with the same group in order to achieve coordination. One
should note that team reasoning agrees with our model of social ties regarding the
behavioral predictions in the context of the ST game.
However, the main limitation of Bacharach’s theory is that it does not clarify what
the probabilistic distribution ω stands for in the definition of an unreliable team
interaction structure. In fact, while such probabilities may depend on some intrinsic
features of the game such as the payoff structure, they may also reasonably be
determined by some pre-existent social relationships between the players: two
strongly (respectively weakly) tied individuals may indeed each have a high proba-
bility of being in we-mode (resp. I-mode) in situations like the above ST game.
To further the analysis, let us note that the concept of unreliable team interaction
can be seen as a special type of incomplete information games5 where the only
uncertainty one can have is regarding the level to which other players identify with
different groups (e.g., agent i may identify with the group {i, j} with probability ω or
with the group {i} with probability 1−ω). In other words, this theory relies on the
Table 4 Protocol equilibria (with Xa∈{Out, In Ca, In Da} and Xb∈{Cb, Db})
Probability we-mode Protocol equilibria (for U∈{Um, Us})
ω=0 In Ca;Cb;X aX bð Þ
Out;Db;X aX bð Þ
0<ω≤3/4 In Ca;Cb; In CaCbð Þ if U ¼ U s
InCa;Cb;Out Cbð Þ if U ¼ Um
Out;Db; In DaDbð Þ
3/4<ω≤8/9 In Ca;Cb; In CaCbð Þ if U ¼ U s
Out;Db; In DaDbð Þ
8/9<ω<1 (Out,Db,In DaDb)
ω=1 (Xa,Xb,In DaDb)
5 Note that we do not refer to the usual Bayesian game as defined by Harsanyi here. It is indeed shown in
(Hakli et al. 2010) that a Bayesian game generated from Bacharach’s unreliable team interaction structure
does not yield the same action recommendation.
assumption that every agent identifies with a unique team at a given time, which is a
strong assumption. This observation therefore raises the issue of the endogenous
determination of the mode of reasoning (i.e., I-mode/we-mode). In fact, a fundamental
point in Bacharachs original theory, in contrast to Sugden’s theory, is that the
determination of mode of reasoning is a psychological matter, prior to any rational
choice, and such a process is based on frames. A frame, as first introduced in
Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) through the Variable Frame Theory, can be defined
as a set of concepts that an agent uses when thinking about a decision problem: a
person may then start to we/I-reason only if he has “we”/”I” concepts in his frame,
which leads him to answer the corresponding question “What shall we/I do?”. While
Bacharach’s theory assumes an agent can only use one frame at once (i.e., an agent
cannot reason in I-mode and we-mode at the same time), it is suggested in Smerilli
(2010) that some vacillation between different frames may actually occur in one’s
mind when facing a decision problem. The corresponding model indeed defines the
probability ω as a function of the probability of vacillating from we-mode to I-mode
and the probability of vacillating from I-mode to we-mode. Applying such a model to
our current ST game leads to the following interpretation: if Alice and Bob start by
we-reasoning, there will be a unique we-equilibrium (In, Da; Db), which is not a Nash
equilibrium. So if Alice starts with we-mode reasoning, she will not be happy with the
result and move away from this equilibrium (e.g., by playing (Out, ·)). If instead Alice
starts with the I-mode, both individuals shall not be happy (both (In, Ca; Cb) and
(Out, Da; Db) are dominated by the previous “we” solution (In, Da; Db)). In this case
there can be a continuous switching or vacillation from one frame to another. As
shown in (Smerilli 2010), this interpretation is similar to that of the well known
prisoner’s dilemma, which therefore suggests that miscoordination should prevail in
the ST subgame.6 Consequently, one could conjecture that reinforcing social ties
between individuals in the ST game decreases the probability p of vacillating between
we-mode and I-mode, while increasing the probability q of vacillating between I-
mode and we-mode.
Why team reasoning cannot express gradual social ties
Following the previous analysis of team reasoning, one may however wonder
whether this interpretation, and more generally Sugden and Bacharach’s theories,
are actually adequate to interpret the effects of social ties, as they clearly forbid the
possibility that an agent is reasoning in two different modes at the same time. Indeed,
in some unpublished work (1997), Bacharach allows for the existence of some
“superordinate” frame where an agent can see the problem from both the ‘I’ and
the ‘we’ perspective, even though he states that those perspectives cannot hold
simultaneously. However, this interpretation, which is assumed in Sugden and
Bacharach’s theories, does clearly not allow to capture the fact that one may identify
with a given group up to a certain degree. The need for such a gradual group
identification is justified by the various social features that may simultaneously define
6 Experimental results in the Prisoner’s dilemma have shown that the cooperation rate varies between 30
and 40 % (see, e.g., Shafir and Tversky 1992).
one’s social identity, as suggested by our basic definition of social ties from “A
definition of social ties.” For example, two individuals may consider political orien-
tations (e.g., being a Democrat) and religion (e.g., being a Catholic) as very important
social features. In this case, it is reasonable to state that the social tie between them if
they share both of these features (e.g., both are Democrat and Catholic) is stronger
than if they share only one of those (e.g., both are Democrat, but one is Catholic while
the other is Muslim), which is itself assumed to be stronger than sharing none of them
(e.g., one is Republican and Catholic while the other is Democrat and Muslim).
In order to illustrate more formally the differences existing between our model of
social ties from “A theory of how to model social ties” and the concept of team
reasoning from “Players as team-directed reasoners,” let us consider a simple
concrete two player game where Player (i) can choose between three options:
A, B, and C. In such a scenario, each player’s payoff is determined uniquely
from these options according to Table 5 (for simplicity, Player (j) has no
control over the outcome).7 Note that the pair’s payoff function can then follow
either utilitarianism (i.e., sum of individual payoffs) or the maximin principle (i.e.,
minimum of individual payoffs).
Applying team reasoning to this particular situation leads to the following pre-
dictions: Player (i) will play A if reasoning in I-mode (Player (i) is then self-
interested), and Player (i) will play B if reasoning in we-mode (Player (i) then
identifies with the group). As a consequence, according to both Bacharach and
Sugden’s theories of team reasoning (and independently of whether the group utility
function follow utilitarianism or the maximin principle), Player (i) will never happen
to choose C. Indeed, while Sugden’s theory does clearly not allow for such gradual
team identification, Bacharach’s theory cannot provide an unreliable team interaction
structure with a probability ω of identifying with the group (0≤ω≤1) that specifies
this outcome to occur.
On the other hand, considering the same game through our model of social ties
from “A theory of how to model social ties” leads to a different interpretation: in this
case, Player (i) will select A if both players are extremely close to each other
(e.g., kij=kji=1), and Player (i) will select B if they instead are perfect strangers
(e.g., kij=kji=0). However, if both players are neither best friends nor perfect
strangers but, say, simple acquaintances (e.g., kij=kji=0.5), then Player (i) will choose
C (assuming either utilitarianism or the maximin principle as the group utility function),
as a compromise between being self-interested and altruistic. One can therefore observe
that the concept of team reasoning has limited expressive power in the context of social
ties, as all the theories presented “Players as team-directed reasoners” are unable tomake
such an intuitive prediction.
In fact, we claim that our model of social ties is more general than team reasoning
in the sense that it allows for a gradual measure of group identification, which, we
believe, is an important requirement to capture the actual ongoing behavior under the
effects of social ties, as suggested by “A definition of social ties”: according to our
model, an agent may indeed partially identify with the group while remaining partly
7 The game presented here is overly simplistic as a means to illustrate the above point, which could of
course also be found in more classical types of social interactions.
self-interested. More generally, our model allows to represent the fact that a person is
socially tied with another individual up to a certain degree.
Furthermore, the characteristics of our model of social ties seem even more
suitable to realistically represent more flexible and heterogenous multi-player in-
teractions where different coalitions might be formed (depending on the way the
agents are socially tied with one another). Such complex games indeed justify the
need for a continuous measure of group identification: as social ties are defined as
independent values from an individual to another, an agent may then be similarly tied
with various individuals at the same time. Consider, for example, a scenario where
one faces the dilemma between cooperating with a close friend, and cooperating with
a family member. In this case, assuming the friend and the family member do not
know each other, it does clearly not make sense for one to reason as a unique team
including all individuals. As a result of identifying with either of the subgroups (i.e.,
either the one including the friend or the one including the family member), the
theories of team reasoning would then predict that one will choose over these two
options, even though a more egalitarian solution might exist that would satisfy more
equally all players. Under the same condition, our model of social ties would instead
suggest to select the latter solution. We however postpone the detailed study of such
complex situations to future work.
Further hypotheses
As previously mentioned, the main goal of our ST game is to investigate whether
social ties affect social preferences. According to our model of social ties presented in
“A theory of how to model social ties,” our first hypothesis is that social ties do not
correlate with inequity aversion. Indeed, while our model of ties supports coordina-
tion on the (In, Da; Db) outcome in the presence of a social tie, inequity aversion
instead predicts that Alice will play (Out, ·), no matter whether she is and/or expects
Table 5 Simple dictator game
Player (i)’s option Playoffs
Player (i) Player (j) Collective (sum) Collective (min)
A 8 0 8 0
B 5 7 12 5
C 7 4 11 4
a b c
Fig. 7 Transformed social tie games without outside option
Bob to be inequity averse. However, our model of ties cannot be easily distinguished
from the model of fairness presented in “Theory of fairness”: both theories may
indeed predict the same outcome (In, Da; Db) can appear to be a unique social welfare
equilibrium. In order to discriminate between those models, one may then consider a
version of the ST game where the outside option is removed (that is, without the
possibility for Alice to choose between In and Out before the coordination game): this
simply corresponds to playing the coordination game alone. Figure 7 illustrates it
through examples of the corresponding transformed payoff matrix when applying
social preferences and the model of social ties to the reduced game.
According to Fig. 7a, both Alice and Bob are extremely inequity averse agents
(i.e., αa=αb=βa=βb=1), which leads them to miscoordinate by playing the (Ca, Db)
solution. Similarly, considering extremely fair agents (i.e., λ=δ=1 for Alice and Bob)
as in Fig. 7b shows that both players cannot be expected to always coordinate: as the
resulting game (which thus corresponds to a version of the Hi-Lo matching game)
yields two different social welfare equilibria, both strategies can become rational for
both players. However, considering our model of social ties (with kab=kba=1), as in
Fig. 7c, shows that both players should still coordinate on the (Da, Db) outcome,
which corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium of the resulting game. As the main
result of this analysis, our model of ties clearly predicts that the outside option is
irrelevant in the presence of a social tie between Alice and Bob. The players’
behavior remains the same independently of the presence of this outside option. In
addition to the stability in the agents’ behavior it allows for, our model of ties appears
to be more realistic than Charness and Rabin’s theory of Fairness. In fact, as shown
through “Theory of fairness”, convergence towards a unique social welfare equilib-
rium requires a high level of fairness, along with some FI reasoning, and a propensity
to help the worst-off person over maximizing the group payoff. Assuming that human
beings have bounded computational resources, our model of social ties, which clearly
relies on some low level of strategic reasoning, seems definitely more adequate to
solve the sort of dilemma introduced by the ST game.
Furthermore, one should note that both our model of social ties and the concept of
team reasoning happen to make the same predictions in the context of the ST game,
no matter whether the outside option is present or not. Such an observation therefore
suggests the need for investigating other relevant game theoretic situations in future
work, as a means to disentangle predictions from those theories (see, e.g., the game in
Table 5 from “A theory of how to model social ties”).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a game that appears to have very nice properties to
investigate the behavioral effects of social ties. Indeed it creates a dilemma between
maximizing self-interest and maximizing social welfare. It differs however from
existing economic games from the experimental economic literature that elicit similar
properties, such as the trust game, the ultimatum game, and the dictator game. Those
games indeed provide situations where people’s decision may be influenced by some
psychological factors (e.g., disappointment, regret, and guilt) (Geanakoplos et al.
1989). While investigating the impact of social ties on social emotions clearly
represents an interesting research orientation for future work, it is not the motivation
of this paper: the strategic structure of the ST game introduced in “A social ties game”
can hardly allow for such emotional reasoning. Moreover, a clear advantage of the ST
game is that it is well suited to evaluate the very plausible theory of team reasoning in
the context of social ties: the stronger the tie between individuals, the more they may
act as members of the same group.
However, as this work is purely theoretical, it clearly suggests some further exper-
imental analysis. The next stage of this study therefore consists of testing and evaluating
the main hypotheses made in the previous section. To do so, we intend to conduct
experimental sessions where people will be asked to interact (1) with some perfect
strangers, and (2) with some socially connected individuals (e.g., friends, classmates,
teammates, etc) in the context of our ST game in extensive form.
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